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Abstract
We give an AM protocol that allows the verifier to sample elements x from a probability
distribution P, which is held by the prover. If the prover is honest, the verifier outputs (x,P(x))
with probability close to P(x).
In case the prover is dishonest, one may hope for the following guarantee: if the verifier
outputs (x, p), then the probability that the verifier outputs x is close to p. Simple examples
show that this cannot be achieved. Instead, we show that the following weaker condition holds
(in a well defined sense) on average: If (x, p) is output, then p is an upper bound on the
probability that x is output.
Our protocol yields a new transformation to turn interactive proofs where the verifier uses
private random coins into proofs with public coins. The verifier has better running time com-
pared to the well-known Goldwasser-Sipser transformation (STOC, 1986). For constant-round
protocols, we only lose an arbitrarily small constant in soundness and completeness, while our
public-coin verifier calls the private-coin verifier only once.
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1 Introduction
In an interactive proof [GMR89, Bab85, BM88], an all-powerful prover tries to convince a compu-
tationally bounded verifier that some statement is true. The study of such proofs has a rich history,
and has lead to numerous important and surprising results.
We are interested in interactive protocols that allow the verifier to sample elements from a
probability distribution. Such protocols have proved to be very useful, and their applications
include the study of private versus public coins in interactive proof systems [GS86], perfect zero
knowledge [For87], basing average-case hardness or cryptographic security on worst-case hardness
[FF93, BT06, AGGM06, HMX10], and many more.
We consider constant-round protocols that allow the verifier to sample an element x from a
probability distribution P together with an approximation p of the probability P(x). The verifier
outputs pairs (x, p), and for a fixed prover we let (X,P ) be the random variables corresponding to
the verifier’s output, PXP is their joint distribution, and PX is the marginal distribution defined as
PX(x) =
∑
p PXP (x, p). We would like to achieve the following properties:
Property 1: For every x we have PX(x) ≈ P(x).
Property 2: If the verifier outputs (x, p), then p ≈ PX(x).
Recently, Haitner et al. [HMX10] gave such a protocol for sampling a distribution P on bit
strings, which is given as P = f(PU ) for an efficiently computable function f , where PU is the
uniform distribution on n-bit strings. For any (possibly cheating) prover their protocol achieves
property 1 with equality (i.e. PX(x) = P(x)), and property 2 for polynomially small error (i.e. p =
(1± ε)P(x) for ε polynomially small in n). The protocol extends to distributions f(PS), where PS
is the uniform distribution on an efficiently decidable set S ⊆ {0, 1}n.
1.1 Contributions of this Paper
We give a sampling protocol that is similar to the one of [HMX10]. However, in our protocol only
the prover gets as input the distribution P. This distribution can be arbitrary, and in particular
does not have to be efficiently samplable. The verifier does not get P as input, and in particular
does not have the ability to sample from P.
We obtain the following completeness guarantee:
Completeness: If the prover is honest, then both properties 1 and 2 are satisfied.
More precisely, property 1 is satisfied with polynomially small error (i.e. PX(x) =
(1± ε)P(x) for polynomially small ε), and instead of property 2 we even guarantee that
the verifier only outputs pairs (x,P(x)).
In case the prover is not honest, since the verifier does not know P, we cannot hope to satisfy
property 1. However, one could hope that property 2 is satisfied for any (possibly cheating) prover.
Unfortunately, simple examples show that this cannot be achieved. Instead, we prove the following
weaker guarantee:
Soundness: The following condition holds (in a well defined sense) on average: If (x, p)
is output, then PX(x) ≤ p.
To illustrate the usefulness of our protocol, we apply it to obtain a private-coin to public-
coin transformation for interactive proofs in Section 4. Compared to the original transformation
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by Goldwasser and Sipser [GS86], our transformation is more efficient in terms of the verifier’s
running time. In particular, for constant-round protocols we only lose an arbitrarily small constant
in soundness and completeness, while executing the private-coin verifier exactly once. We show
that this transformation can be viewed as an interactive sampling process, where the public-coin
verifier iteratively samples messages for the private-coin verifier and requests the corresponding
answers from the prover.
We remark that the soundness guarantee of our protocol is weaker than the one of the [HMX10]
protocol. However, as mentioned above, the guarantee of [HMX10] cannot be achieved in the more
general setting we consider. Furthermore, to achieve a private-coin to public-coin transformation,
it is also possible to employ the [HMX10] sampling protocol. However, this yields a less efficient
public-coin verifier, as the private coin-verifier must be executed many times when running the
sampling protocol.
1.2 Related Work
Interactive protocols. Interactive proof systems were introduced by Goldwasser et al. [GMR89].
Independently, Babai and Moran [Bab85, BM88] defined the public-coin version. As mentioned
above, Goldwasser and Sipser [GS86] showed that the two definitions are equivalent with respect
to language recognition (for a nice exposition of the proof, we also refer to the book of Goldre-
ich [Gol08]). The study of interactive proofs has a long and rich history, influencing the study
of zero knowledge and probabilistic checkable proofs, and has lead to numerous important and
surprising results such as IP = PSPACE [LFKN92, Sha92]. For historical overviews we refer for
example to [Bab90, Gol08, AB09].
Interactive sampling protocols. Goldwasser and Sipser [GS86] show that private coins in
interactive proofs can be made public. A constant-round set lower bound protocol is introduced
which can be viewed as a sampling process: the verifier uses pairwise independent hashing to
randomly select a few elements in a large set. This protocol is used in many subsequent works
such as [For87, AH91, GVW02, BT06, AGGM06, HMX10]. To study the complexity of perfect
zero knowledge, Fortnow [For87] introduces a constant-round protocol that allows to prove set
upper bounds assuming that the verifier is given a uniform random element in the set, which is
not known to the prover. The same protocol is used in a similar context by Aiello and Håstad
[AH91]. As in the lower bound protocol, hashing is used to sample a small number of elements
from the set. To prove that any interactive proof system can have perfect completeness, Goldreich
et al. [GMS87] give a protocol that allows to sample a perfectly uniform random element from a
decidable set. Their protocol requires a polynomial number of rounds (depending on the set size),
and they show that no constant-round protocol can achieve this task. The upper and lower bound
protocols of [GS86, For87, AH91] are used by Bogdanov and Trevisan [BT06] in their proof that the
worst-case hardness of an NP-complete problem cannot be used to show the average-case hardness
of an NP problem via non-adaptive reductions, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. The
ideas used in the set lower and upper bound protocols can be employed to sample a single element
from an NP set in case the verifier knows the set size. This is done in [GVW02] in the context of
studying interactive proofs with bounded communication. This protocol is refined by Akavia et
al. [AGGM06], where it is used to give protocols for proving the size of a set (both upper and lower
bound) under the assumption that the verifier knows some approximate statistics about the size
of the set. These protocols are then used to study the question whether one-way functions can be
based on NP-hardness. The ideas behing the sampling protocol by Akavia et al. are refined and
extended by Haitner et al. [HMX10] in order to give a protocol that allows to sample an element
4
x← P of a given distribution, which is specified as P = f(PU ) for an efficiently computable function
f , where PU is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}n. The verifier outputs (x, p), where x is sampled
from P, and p = (1±ε)P(x) for polynomially small ε. Their protocol extends to distributions f(PS),
where PS is the uniform distribution on an efficiently decidable set S ⊆ {0, 1}n. It is shown that
this sampling protocol can be employed to allow the verifier to verify the shape of the distribution
P, in terms of its histogram. These protocols are used to prove that a number of cryptographic
primitives, such as statistically hiding commitment, cannot be based on NP-hardness via certain
classes of reductions (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Definitions
We denote sets using calligraphic letters A,B, . . .. We usually denote the elements of a set X using
lower case letters x1, x2, . . .. For n ∈ N we let (n) := {0, 1, . . . , n} and [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For a finite set X , a probability distribution PX over X is a function PX : X → [0, 1] that
satisfies the condition
∑
x∈X PX(x) = 1. For a setM⊆ X we let PX(M) =
∑
x∈M PX(x). We will
denote random variables by capital letters (e.g. X), and values they assume by lower case letters
(e.g. x). Probability distributions that are not specifically associated with a random variable will
be denoted by P.
We say a function f : N→ N is time-constructible if there exists an algorithm that runs in time
O(f(n)) and on input 1n outputs f(n).
2.2 Concentration Bounds
We use several concentration bounds, and first state the well-known Chebyshev and Chernoff
bounds.
Lemma 2.1 (Chebyshev’s inequality). For any random variable X where E[X] and Var[X] are
finite, and any k ∈ R>0 we have
Pr
[∣∣X − E[X]∣∣ ≥ k ·√Var[X]] ≤ 1/k2.
Lemma 2.2 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xk be independent random variables where for all i we
have Xi ∈ {0, 1} and Pr[Xi = 1] = p for some p ∈ (0, 1). Define X˜ := 1k
∑
i∈[k] Xi. Then for any
ε > 0 it holds that
Pr
X1,...,Xk
[
X˜ ≥ p+ ε
]
< exp
(
−ε
2k
2
)
, Pr
X1,...,Xk
[
X˜ ≤ p− ε
]
< exp
(
−ε
2k
2
)
.
Hoeffding’s bound [Hoe63] states that for k independent random variables X1, . . . ,Xk that take
values in some appropriate range, with high probability their sum is close to its expectation.
Lemma 2.3 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let X1, . . . ,Xk be independent random variables with Xi ∈
[a, b], define X˜ := 1k
∑
i∈[k] Xi and let p = EX1,...,Xk [X˜ ]. Then for any ε > 0 we have
Pr
X1,...,Xk
[
X˜ ≥ p+ ε
]
≤ exp
(
− 2ε
2k
(b− a)2
)
,
Pr
X1,...,Xk
[
X˜ ≤ p− ε
]
≤ exp
(
− 2ε
2k
(b− a)2
)
.
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2.3 Interactive Proofs
In an interactive proof, an all-powerful prover tries to convince a computationally bounded verifier
that her claim is true. The notion of an interactive protocol formalizes the interaction between the
prover and the verifier, and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Interactive Protocol). Let n ∈ N, V : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗∪{accept, reject},
P : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, and k, ℓ,m : N → N. A k-round interactive protocol (V, P ) with message
length m and ℓ random coins between V and P on input x ∈ {0, 1}n is defined as follows:
1. Uniformly choose random coins r ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(n) for V .
2. Let k := k(n) and repeat the following for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1:
a) mi := V (x, i, r, a0, . . . , ai−1),mi ∈ {0, 1}m(n)
b) ai := P (x, i,m0, . . . ,mi), ai ∈ {0, 1}m(n)
Finally, we have V (x, k, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) ∈ {accept, reject}.
We denote by (V (r), P )(x) ∈ {accept, reject} the output of V on random coins r after an interaction
with P . We say that (x, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mj , aj) is consistent for V if for all i ∈ (k − 1) we have
V (x, i, r, a0, . . . , ai−1) = mi. Finally, if (x, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) is not consistent for V , then
V (x, k, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = reject. ♦
We remark that we restrict the verifier to only accept consistent transcripts as this will simplify
the notation in Section 4.
We now define the classes IP and AM of interactive proofs. The definition of IP was initially given
by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89], and the definition of AM goes back to Babai [Bab85].
Definition 2.5 (IP and AM). The set
IP

rounds = k(n)
time = t(n)
msg size = m(n)
coins = ℓ(n)
compl ≥ c(n)
sound ≤ s(n)

contains the languages L that admit a k-round interactive protocol (V, P ) with message length m
and ℓ random coins, and the following properties:
Efficiency: V can be computed by an algorithm such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and P ∗ the
total running time of V in (V, P ∗)(x) is at most t(|x|).
Completeness:
x ∈ L =⇒ Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ(|x|)
[(V (r), P )(x) = accept] ≥ c(|x|).
Soundness: For any P ∗ we have
x /∈ L =⇒ Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ(|x|)
[(V (r), P ∗)(x) = accept] ≤ s(|x|).
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The set AM is defined analogously, with the additional restriction that (V, P ) is public-coin, i.e. for
all i, mi is an independent uniform random string. We sometimes omit the msg size and coins
parameters from the notation, in which case they are defined to be at most time. If we omit the
time parameter, it is defined to be poly(n). We then let
IP := IP
 rounds = poly(n)compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3
 , AM := AM
 rounds = 1compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

♦
Instead of writing (for example) L ∈ AM(rounds = k, time = t, compl ≥ c, sound ≤ s), we
sometimes say that L has a k-round public-coin interactive proof with completeness c and soundness
s, where the verifier runs in time t.
Babai and Moran [BM88] showed that in the definition of AM above, setting rounds = k for any
constant k ≥ 1 yields the same class.
Assuming deterministic provers. For proving the soundness condition of an interactive proof,
without loss of generalty we may assume that the prover is determinsitic: we consider the deter-
ministic prover that always sends the answer which maximizes the verifier’s acceptance probability.
No probabilistic prover can achieve better acceptance probability.
2.4 Hash Functions
A family of pairwise independent hash functions satisfies the property that for any x, x′, the distri-
bution (h(x), h(x′)) over the choice of h from the family is uniform. More generally, we can define
this concept for k-tuples:
Definition 2.6 (k-wise independent hash functions). A family of functions H(n,m) = {h :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} is k-wise independent if for any x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n and y1, . . . , yk ∈ {0, 1}m
we have Prh←H(n,m)[∀i ∈ [k] : h(xi) = yi] = 2−km. ♦
Such families exist, and can be efficiently sampled for any k = poly(n,m) [CW79]. The following
lemma, as given by Nisan [Nis92], states that for any set B ⊆ {0, 1}n, if we choose a pairwise
independent hash function h from n to m bits, then the size of the set {y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m} is close
to its expected value |B|2m with high probability. If a 3-wise independent hash function is used, this
property holds even conditioned on h(x) = 0 for some fixed x.
Lemma 2.7 (Hash Mixing Lemma). Let B ⊆ {0, 1}n, x ∈ {0, 1}n. If H(n,m) is a family of 2-wise
independent hash functions mapping n bits to m bits, then the following holds.
(i) For all γ > 0 we have
Pr
h←H(n,m)
[
|{y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m}| /∈ (1± γ) |B|
2m
]
≤

2m
γ2|B| if |B| > 0
0 if |B| = 0.
If H(n,m) is a family of 3-wise independent hash functions mapping n bits to m bits, then the
following holds.
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(ii) If x /∈ B, then for all γ > 0 we have
Pr
h←H(n,m)
[
|{y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m}| /∈ (1± γ) |B|
2m
∣∣∣h(x) = 0m] ≤

2m
γ2|B| if |B| > 0
0 if |B| = 0.
(iii) If x ∈ B, then for all γ > 0 we have
Pr
h←H(n,m)
[
|{y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m}| /∈ 1 + (1± γ) |B| − 1
2m
∣∣∣h(x) = 0m] ≤

2m
γ2(|B|−1) if |B| > 1
0 if |B| = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. We first prove (i). The case |B| = 0 is trivial, so assume |B| > 0. The proof
uses Chebyshev’s inequality (see Lemma 2.1). In the following, all probabilities, expectations and
variances are over h←H(n,m). For some event A we let [A] = 1 if A occurs, and [A] = 0 otherwise.
We define the random variable Z := |{y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m}| and find that
E [Z] = E
∑
y∈B
[h(y) = 0]
 = ∑
y∈B
E [[h(y) = 0]] =
∑
y∈B
Pr[h(y) = 0] =
|B|
2m
,
and
E
[
Z2
]
= E
[
|{y ∈ B : h(y) = 0m}|2
]
= E
[
|{(y, y′) ∈ B2 : h(y) = h(y′) = 0m}|
]
= E
 ∑
(y,y′)∈B2
[h(y) = h(y′) = 0m]
 = ∑
(y,y′)∈B2
E
[
[h(y) = h(y′) = 0m]
]
=
∑
(y,y′)∈B2
Pr
[
h(y) = h(y′) = 0m
]
= |B|2 Pr [h(y) = h(y′) = 0m]
= |B|2
(
Pr
[
h(y) = h(y′) = 0m|y = y′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
|B|
2m
‘
· 1|B|2
+ Pr
[
h(y) = h(y′) = 0m|y 6= y′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
22m
· |B|
2 − |B|
|B|2
)
=
|B|
2m
+
|B|2 − |B|
22m
.
In the fourth equality above we used the pairwise independence of H(n,m). Thus we have
Var[Z] = E[Z2]− E[Z]2 = |B|
2m
− |B|
22m
Now applying Chebyshev’s inequality (Lemma 2.1) for k = γ E[Z]√
Var[Z]
gives the claim, as
Pr [|Z − E[Z]| ≥ γ E[Z]] ≤ 1
k2
=
2m
γ2|B| −
1
|B|γ2 ≤
2m
γ2|B| .
Finally, (ii) and (iii) follow by the following argument: As we have 3-wise independence, we still
have pairwise independence conditioned on h(x) = 0m, and we can apply (i).
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2.5 Histograms
We give the definition of histograms as given in [HMX10]. The histogram of a probability distri-
bution P is a function h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that h(p) = Prx←P[P(x) = p]. The following definition
describes a discretized version of this concept.
Definition 2.8 ((ε, t)-histogram). Let P be a probability distribution on {0, 1}n, fix t ∈ N, and let
ε > 0. For i ∈ (t) we define the i’th interval Ai and the i’th bucket Bi as
Ai :=
(
2−(i+1)ε, 2−iε
]
, Bi := {x : P(x) ∈ Ai} .
We then let h := (h0, . . . , ht) where hi := Prx←P[x ∈ Bi] =
∑
x∈Bi P(x). The tuple h is called the
(ε, t)-histogram of P. ♦
If for all x we have either P(x) = 0 or P(x) ≥ 2−n, and we consider the (ε, t)-histogram of P for t =
⌈n/ε⌉, then ⋃i∈(t) Bi = {0, 1}n and ∑i∈(t) hi = 1. If smaller probabilities occur (e.g. P(x) = 2−2n
for some x), this sum is smaller than 1.
The following observation follows directly from the above definition:
Claim 2.9. For all i ∈ (t) we have hi2iε ≤ |Bi| ≤ hi2(i+1)ε.
Proof. Recall that hi =
∑
x∈Bi P(x) and by definition of Bi we have
|Bi|2−(i+1)ε =
∑
x∈Bi
2−(i+1)ε ≤
∑
x∈Bi
P(x) ≤
∑
x∈Bi
2−iε = |Bi|2−iε.
3 The Sampling Protocol
3.1 Informal Theorem Statement and Discussion
In our sampling protocol, the verifier will output pairs (x, p) ∈ {0, 1}n × (0, 1]. For a fixed prover,
we let (X,P ) be the random variables corresponding to the verifier’s output, and we denote their
joint distribution by PXP . Also, PX is defined by PX(x) =
∑
p PXP (x, p). Informally, our sampling
theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (The Sampling Protocol, informal). There exists a constant-round public-coin in-
teractive protocol1 such that the following holds. The verifier and the prover take as input n ∈
N, ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), and the prover additionally gets as input a probability distribution P over {0, 1}n.
The verifier runs in time poly
(
n
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
and we have:
Completeness: If the prover is honest, then the verifier outputs (x,P(x)) with probability (1 ±
ε)P(x).
Soundness: Fix any (possibly cheating) prover. Then for all x ∈ {0, 1}n we have ∑p PXP (x,p)p ≤
1 + ε+ δ.
The soundness condition may not be very intuitive at first sight. We therefore discuss it in
detail below.
To keep the discussion simple, the above theorem statement is only almost true: in fact, the
completeness only holds with probability 1 − ε over the choice of x from P, and the soundness
1 See Definition 2.4 for a standard definition of interactive protocols.
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condition only holds if we condition on good protocol executions (where an execution is bad with
probability at most ε). We omit this here, and refer to Theorem 3.2 for the exact statement.
We will prove soundness only for deterministic provers, but the same statement holds in case
the prover is probabilistic: this follows easily by conditioning on the prover’s random choices, and
applying the result for the deterministic prover.2
In the sampling protocol of [HMX10] (as described above) the verifier gets access to the distri-
bution P, in the sense that a circuit computing a function f is provided as input to the protocol,
where P = f(PU ) and PU is the uniform distribution. During the execution of the sampling proto-
col, the function f needs to be evaluated many times. In contrast, in our protocol the verifier does
not get access to the distribution, and never needs to evaluate such a circuit.
We note that the verifier runs in polynomial time for any polynomially small ε and constant δ.
It is an interesting open problem if it is possible to improve the protocol to allow both polynomially
small δ and ε and an efficient verifier.
Discussion of the soundness condition. The main motivation for the soundness condition
is that it is actually sufficient for applying the sampling protocol to obtain the private-coin to
public-coin transformation in Section 4.
However, there are several remarks we would like to discuss. We first give an overview of these
remarks, and then discuss them in detail below.
• Remark 1: Fix any (possibly cheating) prover and recall property 2 as described in the
introduction: If the verifier outputs (x, p), then p ≈ PX(x). One may hope to give a protocol
that satisfies this property. However, we show below that this cannot be achieved in our
setting.
• Remark 2: It is possible to interpret the soundness condition as follows: The situation
PX(x) ≫ p cannot occur too often. In that sense, the protocol provides an upper bound on
PX(x) “on average”.
• Remark 3: Assume the completeness condition is satisfied. Then the soundness condition
actually holds if the prover behaves like a convex combination of honest provers, i.e. it first
chooses a distribution P from a set of distributions, and then behaves honestly for P.
• Remark 4: It is natural to ask if the converse of the statement in remark 3 is also true. That
is, we ask the following. Suppose we have some protocol that satisfies both our completeness
and soundness conditions. Fix any prover and consider the verifier’s output distribution PXP .
Is there a convex combination of probability distributions, such that if the prover first chooses
P and then behaves honestly for P, the verifier’s output distribution equals PXP ? We show
below that this is not the case in general.
Proving the soundness condition that any cheating prover can be seen as a convex combination
of honest provers would imply that the protocol is optimal, since for any protocol a probabilistic
prover actually can first choose some distribution and then behave honestly for it. Remark 4 implies
that our soundness condition does not imply this in general.
2 We remark that our definition of interactive protocols (Definition 2.4) does not allow the prover to use random-
ness. This is because when considering decision problems, the prover can always be assumed to be deterministic, as
explained in Section 2.3. However, since our theorem does not consider a decision problem, and the sampling protocol
might be used as a subprotocol of some other protocol, we do not assume that the prover is deterministic.
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Remark 1: Property 2 cannot be achieved. Unfortunately, property 2 is impossible to
achieve, and we now describe a strategy for a dishonest (probabilistic) prover that shows this. Let
P0 be the uniform distribution on {0n, 1n} and P1 the distribution that outputs 0n with probability
1. The prover chooses b← {0, 1} uniformly at random, and then behaves like the honest prover for
Pb (i.e. conditioned on b, the completeness condition is satisfied for Pb). We find that PX(0
n) ≈ 3/4
and PX(1
n) ≈ 1/4. But still we have for both x ∈ {0n, 1n} that PXP (x, 1/2) ≈ 1/4. Thus, if the
verifier outputs (x, p), both variants PX(x)≫ p and PX(x)≪ p are possible.3
Remark 2: The situation PX(x) ≫ p cannot occur too often. We cannot hope to avoid
PX(x) ≪ p, since the prover can always choose to make the verifier reject with, say, probability
1/2, and behave honestly for a given distribution P otherwise. In that case for any x we have
PX(x) = PXP (x,P(x)) ≈ P(x)/2≪ P(x).
We now consider the case PX(x)≫ p. An interpretation of our soundness condition is that the
situation PX(x)≫ p cannot occur too often, and we now explain this. For any fixed x we find
∑
p
PXP (x, p)
p
=
∑
p
PP |X(p, x)
PX(x)
p
= E
p←PP |X=x
[
PX(x)
p
]
and thus the soundness condition is equivalent to
E
p←PP |X=x
[
PX(x)
p
]
≤ 1 + ε+ δ.
Indeed, an interpretation of this statement is that for any x, on average, P is not much smaller
than PX(x). In this sense, p provides an upper bound on PX(x) on average.
Remark 3: The soundness condition holds for a convex combination of provers. We
proceed to argue that the soundness condition actually holds in case the prover first chooses a
distribution P from a set of distributions and then behaves honestly for P. First observe that for
the prover strategy using P0 and P1 as described above (see remark 1), our soundness property
actually holds for 0n: ∑
p
PXP (0
n, p)
p
≈ 1/4
1/2
+
1/2
1
= 1
And indeed, this property holds for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and any strategy where the prover first chooses
some distribution Pi with probability qi, and then behaves honestly for Pi. Let I be the random
variable over the choice of i indexing the distributions Pi. We find∑
p
PXP (x, p)
p
=
∑
p
∑
i
qi Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p)|I = i]
p
=
∑
i
qi
∑
p
Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p)|I = i]
p
=
∑
i:Pi(x)>0
qi
Pr[(X,P ) = (x,Pi(x))|I = i]
Pi(x)
≈
∑
i:Pi(x)>0
qi ≤ 1.
If the prover decides to make the verifier reject with some probability, then the above sum decreases.
3 To be very explicit, we have PXP (0
n, 1/2) = 1/4, and PX(0
n) = 3/4 ≫ 1/2. On the other hand, we find
PXP (1
n, 1/2) = 1/4, and PX(1
n) = 1/4≪ 1/2.
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Remark 4: Soundness does not necessarily imply a convex combination of provers.
Consider the following distribution PXP : PXP (x1, 1/2) = 1/4, PXP (x1, 1/4) = 1/8, PXP (x2, 3/4) =
1/2, and PXP (x2, 3/8) = 1/8. Clearly PXP is a probability distribution, and the soundness con-
dition is satisfied, i.e. for x ∈ {x1, x2} we have ∑p PXP (x,p)p = 1. Then the prover who first
chooses a probability distribution and then behaves honestly for it must choose with positive
probability a distribution Pi with Pi(x1) = 1/2. (Otherwise, (x1, 1/2) would have probability
zero). Then Pi(x2) = 1/2, and thus outputting (x2, 1/2) must also have positive probability, but
PXP (x2, 1/2) = 0.
3.2 Technical Overview
We informally describe a simplified version of the sampling protocol of Theorem 3.1, and sketch
how correctness and soundness can be proved. Then we discuss how to get rid of the simplifying
assumptions.
Histograms. Let P be a distribution over {0, 1}n, and consider the (1, n)-histogram of P ac-
cording to Definition 2.8. That is, we let h = (h0, . . . , hn), where hi := Pry←P[y ∈ Bi] for
Bi :=
{
x : P(x) ∈ (2−(i+1), 2−i]
}
. For simplicity we assume that for all x either P(x) = 0 or
P(x) ≥ 2−n, which implies that ∑i∈(n) hi = 1.
A simplified sampling protocol with an inefficient verifier. If efficiency were not an issue,
the honest prover could just send all pairs (x,P(x)) to the verifier, who then outputs (x,P(x)) with
probability P(x). It is clear that this protocol achieves even stronger completeness and soundness
guarantees than stated in our theorem. We now change this protocol, still leaving the verifier
inefficient. But, using hashing, the verifier of this modified protocol can later be made efficient.
To describe the intuition, we make the following simplifications: we let the verifier output
probabilities of the form 2−j , and when interacting with the honest prover, the verifier will output
pairs (x, p) where p is a 2-approximation of P(x). We will also make an assumption on P, but it is
easiest to state it while describing the protocol.
The protocol. The honest prover sends the histogram h of P to the verifier. The verifier splits the
interval [0, n] into intervals Jj of length log2(n). We denote by Ii := J2i the even intervals, and
we will call the odd intervals gaps. For simplicity we assume log2(n) is an even integer, and that∑
k
∑
i∈Ik
hi = 1, i.e. that P is such that h has no probability mass in the gaps. Now the verifier
selects an interval Ik at random, where the probability of Ik corresponds to its weight according
to h, i.e. the probability of Ik is wk :=
∑
j∈Ik
hj. The prover sends sets Xi for i ∈ Ik to the
verifier, where the honest prover lets Xi = Bi. The verifier checks that the Xi are disjoint, and that
|Xi| ∈ 2±1hi2i.4 It then randomly chooses one of the sets Xj , where Xj has probability hj∑
i∈Ik
hj
.
Finally, the verifier chooses a uniform random element x from Xj, and outputs (x, 2−j).
Completeness: It is not hard to see that if the prover is honest, then for any x and j the following
holds. If x ∈ Bj, then PXP (x, 2−j) ∈ 2±1P(x). Otherwise, PXP (x, 2−j) = 0.
Soundness: We sketch a proof for the following soundness guarantee: for any (possibly dishonest)
prover there is an event Bad such that Pr[Bad] ≤ 50/√n, and for all x we have∑p Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)|¬Bad]p ≤
2 + 50/
√
n.
4 Actually, the verifier can check the stronger condition |Xi| ∈ [1/2, 1]hi2
i, but to simplify our statements we use
2±1.
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We let k(j) be the function that outputs the interval of j (i.e. k such that j ∈ Ik). We first
observe that5
PXP (x, 2
−j) ∈ 2±1 · Pr[x ∈ Xj|k = k(j)] · 2−j, (1)
where Pr[x ∈ Xj|k = k(j)] is the probability that the prover puts x into Xj given that k(j) was
chosen by the verifier. To see this, note that PXP (x, 2
−j) = Pr[x ∈ Xj|k = k(j)] ·wk · hj∑
i∈Ik
hi
· 1|Xj | ,
where wk is the probability of choosing k, the third factor is the probability of choosing j given
k was chosen, and 1/|Xj | is the probability of choosing x, given k, j were chosen and x is in Xj .
Indeed, by the definition of wk and using the verifier’s check |Xj | ∈ 2±1hj2j , this implies (1).
To prove our soundness claims, we consider the following sets representing small, medium and
large probabilities, respectively.
S(x) =
{
j : 2−j ≤ PX(x)√
n
}
= {j : j ≥ log2(1/PX(x)) + 1/2 log2(n)} ,
M(x) =
{
j : 2−j >
PX(x)√
n
∧ 2−j < √nPX(x)
}
= {j : log2(1/PX(x)) − 1/2 log2(n) < j < log2(1/PX (x)) + 1/2 log2(n)} ,
L(x) =
{
j : 2−j ≥ √nPX(x)} = {j : j ≤ log2(1/PX (x))− 1/2 log2(n)
}
.
We define the event Bad to occur if the verifier outputs a probability that is much too small, i.e. it
outputs some (x, 2−j) where j ∈ S(x). We find
Pr[Bad] =
∑
x
∑
j∈S(x)
PXP (x, 2
−j)
(1)
≤
∑
x
∑
j∈S(x)
2 · Pr[x ∈ Xj|k = k(j)] · 2−j
≤ 2
∑
x
∑
j∈S(x)
2−j ≤ 2
∑
x
PX(x)√
n
∞∑
i=0
1
2i
≤ 4√
n
,
where the third inequality follows by definition of S.
To prove the second soundness claim, we find
∑
p
Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)∧¬Bad]
p =
∑
j∈M(x)
PXP (x,2
−j)
2−j
+∑
j∈L(x)
PXP (x,2
−j)
2−j
. Now
∑
j∈L(x)
PXP (x, 2
−j)
2−j
≤ 1√
nPX(x)
∑
j∈L(x)
PXP (x, 2
−j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤PX(x)
≤ 1√
n
,
∑
j∈M(x)
PXP (x, 2
−j)
2−j
(1)
≤ 2
∑
j∈M(x)
Pr[x ∈ Xj|k = k(j)] ≤ 2,
where the last inequality again follows since the prover must send disjoint sets Xi, and by definition
of M(x) we have |M(x)| < log2(n) and thus M(x) ∩ Ik is non-empty for at most one Ik. (This
is one reason for defining the intervals, gaps and the sets S,M,L as we did!) Thus we have∑
p
Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)|¬Bad]
p =
1
Pr[¬Bad]
∑
p
Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)∧¬Bad]
p ≤ (1 + 8/
√
n)(2 + 1/
√
n) ≤ 2 + 17/√n.
5 In Eqn. (1) we implicitly assume that the prover always sends disjoint sets Xj that are of appropriate size.
Removing this assumption is a minor technicality that is dealt with in the full proof.
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Making the verifier efficient. In the protocol as sketched above, it is possible to make the
verifier run in time poly(n). To achieve this, the prover does not send the whole sets Bj , but
instead the verifier chooses a 3-wise independent hash function f mapping n bits to m bits, where
m = log2(
∑
i∈Ik
2ihi) + c log2(n). The hash mixing lemma (as given in Section 2.4) ensures that
there are close to nc many elements x ∈ ⋃i∈Ik Bi with f(x) = 0m.6 The prover now only sends these
elements, and the verifier checks that the set sizes are appropriate. It is possible to still achieve
the same soundness and completeness guarantees, and we remark that we specifically designed the
protocol so that this is possible.
Using a more accurate histogram. Using the basis 2ε instead of 2 for the histogram, where
ε is polynomially small allows to improve the protocol as follows. For completeness, there exists
a constant c such that each x is output with probability 2±cεP(x). For soundness, there exist
constants c and d such that Pr[Bad] ≤ cε and ∑p Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)|¬Bad]p ≤ 1 + dε.
Handling general distributions. Above we made the simplifying assumption that there is no
probability mass in the gaps. That is, we assumed
∑
k
∑
i∈Ik
hi = 1. This assumption clearly does
not hold in general. If we analyse the given protocol assuming that
∑
k
∑
i∈Ik
hi = w for some
w ∈ [0, 1], the completeness and soundness guarantees we get change as follows:
Completeness: There exists a constant c such that for any x and j the following holds. If x ∈ Bj
and j ∈ ⋃i Ii, then PXP (x, 2−j) ∈ 2±cεP(x)w . Otherwise, PXP (x, 2−j) = 0.
Soundness: There exist constants c and d such that the following holds. For any (possibly dishonest)
prover there is an event Bad such that Pr[Bad] ≤ cε, and for all x we have ∑p Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)|¬Bad]p ≤
1+dε
w .
Note that by averaging, the verifier can place the gaps such that w > 12 .
For the final protocol, we want that any x has a chance of being output. For this, the verifier
considers both possible gap placements, i.e. it either switches the intervals and gaps, or not by
choosing a random bit s ∈ {0, 1}, where each gap placement is chosen with probability w(s), which
is the weight inside the intervals. For each fixed choice of s the above analysis applies. This gives
that each element is output with the correct probability in case the prover is honest. However, one
only obtains the soundness guarantee
∑
p
Pr[(X,P )=(x,p)|¬Bad]
p ≤ 2(1 + dε).
This factor of 2 can be decreased to (1 + δ) by making the gaps smaller, such that the gap size
equals δ times the interval size. Unfortunately there is a tradeoff: If the gap size is o(log(n)), then
the event Bad no longer has polynomially small probability. Furthermore, if we fix the gap size to
Θ(log(n)), and set δ = o(1), then the verifier is no longer efficient because the prover needs to send
too many elements. For the exact tradeoff, we refer to Theorem 3.2.
Outputting the exact probabilities. To improve the completeness such that the exact prob-
ability P(x) (instead of 2−j) is output, the verifier simply asks the prover to send the correct
probability P(x) ∈ (2−(j+1), 2−j ] in the end.
3.3 Theorem Statement
We now state our main theorem. For an informal discussion of the theorem statement and a proof
sketch we refer to Section 3.2. In our sampling protocol, the verifier will output pairs (x, p) ∈
6 We use 3-wise (and not 2-wise) independent hashing because in the analysis we need to argue that {x′ : x′ ∈⋃
i∈Ik
Bi ∧ f(x
′) = 0m} is of size close to nc even conditioned on the event f(x) = 0 for a fixed x.
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{0, 1}n × (0, 1]. For a fixed prover, we let (X,P ) be the random variables corresponding to the
verifier’s output, and we denote their joint distribution by PXP . Also, PX is defined by PX(x) =∑
p PXP (x, p).
Theorem 3.2 (The Sampling Protocol). There exists a constant-round public-coin interactive
protocol such that the following holds. The verifier and the prover take as input n ∈ N, ε, δ ∈ (0, 1),
and the prover additionally gets as input a probability distribution P over {0, 1}n.
The verifier runs in time poly
(
n
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
and either outputs (x, p) ∈ {0, 1}n× (0, 1], or rejects.
Furthermore, we have:
Completeness: Suppose the prover is honest. Then the verifier rejects with probability at most
ε. Furthermore, there exists a set M⊆ {0, 1}n with P(M) ≥ 1− ε such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n we
have
PXP (x, p)
{
∈ (1± ε) · P(x) if p = P(x) ∧ x ∈M
= 0 otherwise.
Soundness: Fix any deterministic prover. Then there is an event Bad such that the following
holds:
(i) Pr[Bad] ≤ ε,
(ii) For all x ∈ {0, 1}n we have
∑
p∈(0,1]
Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p)|¬Bad]
p
≤ 1 + ε+ δ.
We give a protocol for the case
(9000
ε
)16/δ ≤ 2n/50. In case this inequality does not hold, we only
need to give a protocol that runs in time poly(2n). The protocol where the honest prover sends
{(x,P(x)) : x ∈ {0, 1}n}, and the verifier outputs (x, p) with probability p gives stronger guarantees
than what is required by the theorem, and clearly runs within the required time bound.
3.4 The Protocol
Definitions and protocol parameters. Let H(n,m) be a family of 3-wise independent hash
functions mapping n bits to m bits. Given a finite set J ⊆ N, and a set {(wi, i)}i∈J where
wi ∈ [0, 1], let W({(wi, i)}i∈J ) be the distribution that outputs i with probability wi∑
j∈J
wj
.
Given an input (n, ε′, δ′,P), we define ε := ε′/9000 and δ := δ′/16. Our assumption becomes(1
ε
)1/δ ≤ 2n/50. We let t := ⌈2nε ⌉. For i ∈ (t), let Ai and Bi be defined as in Definition 2.8 for P.
We let
GapSize′ :=
2
ε
log2
(
1
ε
)
, IntervalSize′ :=
GapSize′
δ
,
GapSize :=
⌈
GapSize′
⌉
, IntervalSize :=
⌈
IntervalSize′
GapSize
⌉
GapSize,
SamplingGap := log2
(t · IntervalSize′ · 22·IntervalSize′ε
ε4
)
.
We let K :=
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌈
t
IntervalSize+GapSize
⌉}
. For i ∈ K \ {0} and shift s ∈ S := {−1,GapSize −
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1, 2 ·GapSize− 1, . . . , ( IntervalSizeGapSize − 1) ·GapSize− 1} we define the intervals
I0(s) := {0, . . . , s}
Ii(s) :=
{
s+ iGapSize + (i− 1)IntervalSize + 1, . . . ,
s+ i(GapSize + IntervalSize)
} ∩ (t).
The regions between these intervals will be called gaps.
Claim 3.3. The following properties hold:
(i) IntervalSize,GapSize, IntervalSize
GapSize
∈ N and GapSize, IntervalSize ≥ 1.
(ii) For all i and s we have |Ii(s)| ≤ IntervalSize. The gaps have size exactly GapSize.
(iii) IntervalSize′ ≤ IntervalSize ≤ 2·IntervalSize′, and thus 2SamplingGap is contained in the interval[
t · IntervalSize · 2IntervalSize·ε
2ε4
,
t · IntervalSize · 22·IntervalSize·ε
ε4
]
(iv) There are at least 25 intervals and gaps: |K| ≥ 25.
Proof. Parts (i)-(iii) follow directly by definition. To see (iv), note that
(1
ε
)1/δ ≤ 2n/50, implies
IntervalSize
2 ≤ IntervalSize′ = 1εδ log2
(
1
ε
)
≤ t100 . Thus, since IntervalSize ≥ GapSize, we have that
|K| ≥ tIntervalSize+GapSize ≥ t2IntervalSize ≥ t4IntervalSize′ ≥ 25.
The Sampling Protocol. On input (n, ε′, δ′) to the verifier, and (n, ε′, δ′,P) to the prover:
Prover: Send an (ε, t)-histogram h to the verifier.
If the prover is honest, it lets h be the (ε, t)-histogram of P.
Verifier: Reject if
∑
i∈(t) hi /∈ [1− 2−n, 1]. Define N := {j : hj ≥ ε2t}.
For i ∈ K let wi(s) :=
∑
j∈Ii(s) hj , and define w(s) :=
∑
i∈Kwi(s).
Pick s←W({(w(s), s)}s∈S).
For all i ∈ K define Ii := Ii(s), wi := wi(s), w := w(s) and I ′i := Ii ∩ N .
Pick k ←W({(wi, i)}i∈K), and let
g := SamplingGap +
((
log2(
∑
i∈Ik
2iεhi)− SamplingGap
)
− ⌊log2(∑
i∈Ik
2iεhi)− SamplingGap
⌋)
Let m := max
{
0, log2
(∑
i∈Ik
2iεhi
)− g} (By definition of g, m is integer)
Pick f ←H(n,m), and send (s, k, f) to the prover.
Prover: Send sets {Xi}i∈I′
k
to the verifier.
If the prover is honest, it lets Xi := {x ∈ Bi : f(x) = 0m}.
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Verifier: If one of the following conditions does not hold, reject:
(a) ∀i ∈ I ′k : ∀x ∈ Xi : f(x) = 0m
(b) If m = 0 then ∀i ∈ I ′k : 2iεhi ≤ |Xi| ≤ 2(i+1)εhi
If m > 0 then ∀i ∈ I ′k : 2−ε
2g2iεhi∑
j∈Ik
2jεhj
≤ |Xi| ≤ 2ε 2
g2(i+1)εhi∑
j∈Ik
2jεhj
(c) The sets Xi are pairwise disjoint
Pick j ←W({(hi, i)}i∈Ik). Reject if j /∈ I ′k. Pick x← Xj, and send (j, x) to the prover.
Prover: Send p to the verifier.
If the prover is honest, it sends p := P(x).
Verifier: If p /∈ Aj, let p := 2−jε. Output (x, p).
3.5 Analysis of the Protocol
Throughout this section we assume
(1
ε
)1/δ ≤ 2n/50. For a fixed deterministic prover, we let
S,K,F, J,X,P be the random variables corresponding to s, k, f, j, x, p in the protocol. For s ∈ S
we use the notation PXP |S=s(x, p) = Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p)|S = s] and PX|S=s(x) = Pr[X = x|S = s].
We will prove the following statements about the sampling protocol, which describe the guarantees
we get conditioned on a fixed choice of the gaps, as given by shift s.
Lemma 3.4 (Running time). For any deterministic prover the verifier runs in time poly
(
n
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
.
Lemma 3.5 (Completeness for fixed s). Suppose the prover is honest. Then the verifier rejects
with probability at most 25ε. Furthermore, there exists a set M ⊆ {0, 1}n with P(M) ≥ 1 − 2ε
such that for every s ∈ S there exists a set Ms ⊆ {0, 1}n with w(s) := P(Ms) such that for all
x ∈ {0, 1}n we have
PXP |S=s(x, p)
∈ (1± 132ε) ·
P(x)
w(s) if p = P(x) ∧ x ∈M∩Ms,
= 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, the sets {Ms ∩M}s∈S form a partition of M.
Lemma 3.6 (Soundness for fixed s). Fix any deterministic prover and s ∈ S. There exists a
function fs : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] such that
(i) Pr[P ≤ fs(X)|S = s] ≤ 16ε
w(s)
,
(ii) For all x ∈ {0, 1}n we have
∑
p>fs(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
≤ (1 + 6ε)
w(s)
.
Given these Lemmas, it is not difficult to prove Theorem 3.2. We defer the detailed proof to
Section 3.5.3, and only give a proof sketch.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (Sketch). The running time is given by Lemma 3.4. Defining the event Bad as
P ≤ fS(X), completeness and soundness follow by conditioning on s ∈ S and applying Lemmas 3.5
and 3.6, respectively.
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It remains to prove the three lemmas above. The verifier’s running time is easy to bound, as
we just need to bound t and the size of the sets Xi. The proof can be found in Section 3.5.4.
To prove completeness and soundness, it is useful to consider the probability that the prover
puts x into the set Xi given that f(x) = 0. Formally, for a fixed s ∈ S we define the function
ks :
⋃
i∈K Ii(s) → K that maps j 7→ i such that j ∈ Ii(s). Given a deterministic prover, for any
(x, j) ∈ {0, 1}n × (t) define rs(x, j) :=PrF
[
(a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj
∣∣∣(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)] if j ∈ ⋃ℓ∈K I ′ℓ
0 otherwise.
We note that once a deterministic prover is fixed, the above probability is only over the choice of
f . Also, we are only interested in the cases where (a)-(c) hold, as otherwise the verifier rejects. We
can then relate PXP |S=s(x, p) and rs(x, p) as follows:
Lemma 3.7. Fix any deterministic prover and s ∈ S. Then for any (x, j) ∈ {0, 1}n × (t) we have
∑
p∈Aj
PXP |S=s(x, p) ∈
[
2−2ε
rs(x, j)
w(s) · 2jε , 2
ε rs(x, j)
w(s) · 2jε
]
.
A formal proof can be found in Section 3.5.5. We provide a proof sketch.
Proof (Sketch). The sum in the lemma equals PrX,J [(X,J) = (x, j)|S = s], which equals
wk
w(s)
· 2−m · hj∑
i∈Ik
hi
· rs(x, j) · 1|Xj | ,
where the first factor is the probability that the appropriate k is chosen in the protocol, the second
factor is the probability that f(x) = 0, the third factor is the probability that j is chosen (condi-
tioned on K = k), the fourth factor is the probability that the prover puts x into Xj (conditioned
on (K,F (x), J) = (k, 0m, j)), and the fifth factor is the probability that x is chosen from Xj (con-
ditioned on (K,F (x), J) = (k, 0m, j)∧x ∈ Xj). The lemma then follows by definition of m and the
verifier’s check (b) that specifies the size of the sets Xi.
3.5.1 Proof of completeness: overview
The goal of this section is to prove Lemma 3.5. We only give proof sketches here and defer the
formal proofs to Section 3.5.6. Throughout this section we assume the prover is honest. We prove
completeness for M := ⋃i∈N Bi and
Ms :=
⋃
i∈
⋃
j∈K
Ij(s)
Bi for s ∈ S.
As t is chosen such that only probabilities smaller than 2−2n are neglected, we get
∑
i∈(t) hi ≥ 1−2−n
(see Claim 3.12). Thus, the verifier never rejects after receiving the first message. Also, it is easy
to see that P(M) ≥ 1−2ε and that the sets {Ms∩M}s∈S form a partition ofM (see Claim 3.13).
Now since the protocol only considers hi ≥ ε2t (i.e. i ∈ N ), and by Claim 2.9 we have |Bi| ≥ hi2iε,
the following lower bound on |Bi| for i ∈ N follows (a formal proof can be found in Section 3.5.6):
Claim 3.8. Fix any s ∈ S and consider any protocol execution where (K,S) = (k, s) and m > 0.
Then for all i ∈ I ′k we have |Bi|2m ≥ IntervalSize4ε3 .
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Next, we show that the verifier rejects with small probability only.
Lemma 3.9. The verifier rejects with probability at most 25ε.
We provide a proof sketch, and the full proof can again be found in Section 3.5.6.
Proof (Sketch). First, it is easy to see that the verifier only rejects with small probability due to
j /∈ N , as by choice of t such j is only chosen with small probability.
It remains to show that the verifier rejects in (a)-(c) only with small probability. Clearly, (c)
always holds. The case m = 0 is trivial, so suppose m > 0. Then by definition of m and Claim 2.9,
we find
2g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
≤ |Bi|
2m
≤ 2
g2(i+1)εhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
, (2)
and thus we can apply the hash mixing lemma (Lemma 2.7) part (i), and then Claim 3.8 to find
that (b) holds with high probability.
Finally, we can prove completeness for a fixed value of s. Again, the formal proof can be found
in Section 3.5.6.
Proof of Lemma 3.5 (Sketch). Since the prover is honest, we have r(x, j) = 0 in case x /∈ Bj or
j /∈ N . We first show that for any x ∈ Bj with j ∈ N we have that rs(x, j) is close to 1. In
case m = 0 we clearly have rs(x, j) = 1, so assume m > 0. Since the prover is honest, we get
that rs(x, j) = PrF [(b)|(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]. Assuming f(x) = 0, x is contained in exactly
one set Xi∗ . Now again using (2), the claim follows by first applying the hash mixing lemma
(Lemma 2.7) (part (ii) in case i 6= i∗, and part (iii) in case i = i∗), and then Claim 3.8.
Finally, since the honest prover always sends p = P(x), Lemma 3.7 gives that PXP (x,P(x)) is
close to 2
−jε
w(s) , which in turn is close to
P(x)
w(s) as x ∈ Bj.
3.5.2 Proof of soundness: overview
The goal of this section is to prove Lemma 3.6. Throughout this subsection, fix any deterministic
prover. We first give the following simple claim: since the verifier ensures that the sets Xj sent by
the prover are disjoint, for any s, k the sum over j ∈ Ik(s) of the conditional probabilities rs(x, j)
is at most 1. A formal proof can be found in Section 3.5.7.
Claim 3.10. For any (s, k, x) ∈ S ×K × {0, 1}n we have ∑j∈Ik(s) rs(x, j) ≤ 1.
Fix s ∈ S. We prove soundness for the function fs(x) := PX|S=s(x)2(GapSize/2−1)ε . For a fixed x ∈ {0, 1}n we
define sets S(x),M(x),L(x) ⊆ [0, 1] representing small, medium and large probabilities as follows:
S(x) :=
[
0,
PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−1)ε
]
,
M(x) :=
(
PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−1)ε
, 2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x)
)
,
L(x) :=
[
2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x), 1
]
.
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Now observe that in order for the protocol to output a value p ∈ S(x) (orM(x),L(x), respectively),
the value J chosen in the protocol must be in the set S ′(x) (or M′(x),L′(x), respectively) defined
as follows:
S ′(x) := {j : 2−(j+1)ε ≤ PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−1)ε
}
,
M′(x) := {j : 2−jε > PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−1)ε
∧ 2−(j+1)ε < 2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x)
}
,
L′(x) := {j : 2−jε ≥ 2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x)}.
Proof of Lemma 3.6 (i). We first calculate
Pr[P ≤fs(X)|S = s] =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
p≤fs(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
=
∑
x
∑
p∈S(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p) ≤
∑
x
∑
j∈S′(x)
∑
p∈Aj
PXP |S=s(x, p)
Lem. 3.7≤ 2
ε
w(s)
∑
x
∑
j∈S′(x)
rs(x, j)
2jε
. (3)
To bound this, we find
∑
x
∑
j∈S′(x)
rs(x, j)
2jε
=
∑
x
∑
k
∑
j∈S′(x)∩Ik
rs(x, j)
2jε
≤
∑
x
∑
k
1
2min(S′∩Ik)ε
∑
j∈S′(x)∩Ik
rs(x, j)
Claim 3.10≤
∑
x
∑
k
1
2min(S′∩Ik)ε
· [S ′ ∩ Ik 6= ∅]
≤
∑
x
PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−2)ε
∞∑
i=0
1
2i·GapSize·ε
≤
∑
x
PX|S=s(x)
2(GapSize/2−2)ε
∞∑
i=0
1
2i
≤ 2
2(GapSize/2−2)ε
. (4)
In the third inequality we used the definition of S ′ and S ′∩Ik ⊆ S ′, and that for any k the distance
between any two elements j ∈ Ik and j′ ∈ Ik+1 is at least GapSize. In the fourth inequality we
used that by definition of GapSize, we have 2i·GapSize·ε ≥ 2i·GapSize′·ε = (1ε )i ≥ 2i as ε < 1/2. Thus
the probability in (3) is bounded by 2·2
ε
w(s)2(GapSize/2−2)ε
≤ 2·2ε
w(s)2(GapSize′/2−2)ε
= 2ε2
3ε
w(s) ≤ 16εw(s) , where we
used the definition of GapSize′ and GapSize′ ≤ GapSize.
Proof of Lemma 3.6 (ii). Fix any x ∈ {0, 1}n. We get
∑
p>fs(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
=
∑
p∈M(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
+
∑
p∈L(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
(5)
We bound the two terms separately, and first bound the sum over p ∈ L(x). By definition of
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L, p ≥ 2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x), and thus we find that
∑
p∈L(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
≤ 1
2(GapSize/2−1)εPX|S=s(x)
∑
p∈L(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤PX|S=s(x)
≤ 1
2(GapSize/2−1)ε
= ε2ε ≤ 2ε. (6)
We proceed to bound the sum over M(x). We find
∑
p∈M(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
≤
∑
j∈M′(x)
∑
p∈Aj
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
≤
∑
j∈M′(x)
2(j+1)ε
∑
p∈Aj
PXP |S=s(x, p)
Lem. 3.7≤
∑
j∈M′(x)
2(j+1)εrs(x, j)2
ε
w(s)2jε
=
22ε
w(s)
∑
j∈M′(x)
rs(x, j) ≤ 2
2ε
w(s)
(7)
The second inequality holds because p ∈ Aj implies p ≥ 2−(j+1)ε. The fourth inequality follows by
Claim 3.10 once we observe that by definition of M′(x) we have
M′(x) ⊆
{⌈1
ε
log2
( 1
PX|S=s(x)
)−GapSize
2
⌉
, . . . ,
⌊1
ε
log2
( 1
PX|S=s(x)
)
+
GapSize
2
− 1
⌋}
,
which implies |M′(x)| ≤ GapSize and thus there exists a k such that for all j ∈ M′(x) with
rs(x, j) > 0 we have j ∈ Ik. Plugging (6) and (7) into (5) concludes the proof.
3.5.3 Proof of the main theorem
We prove the main theorem given Lemmas 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. The running time is given by Lemma 3.4,
and so it only remains to prove completeness and soundness.
Proof of completeness. We will use the following claim:
Claim 3.11. Fix any prover and let Ns := ⋃i∈K Ii(s). Then the following holds:
(i) The sets {N s}s∈S form a partition of (t),
(ii) |S| = IntervalSize
GapSize
, and 12δ ≤ |S| ≤ 1δ ,
(iii)
∑
s∈S w(s) ∈ [1− 2−n, 1] · (|S| − 1),
(iv) |S|∑
s∈S
w(s)
≤ 1 + 16δ.
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Proof. Part (i) and (ii) follow by definition. To see (iii), we calculate∑
s∈S
w(s) =
∑
s∈S
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Ii(s)
hj =
∑
s∈S
∑
j∈Ns
hj
= (|S| − 1)
∑
i∈(t)
hj ∈ [1 − 2−n, 1] · (|S| − 1).
where the third inequality follows since part (i) implies that each j ∈ (t) occurs in exactly (|S| − 1)
many sets Ns.
To see (iv), we calculate
|S|∑
s∈S w(s)
(iii)
≤ |S|
(1− 2−n)(|S| − 1) =
1
1− 2−n − 1|S| + 2
−n
|S|
≤ 1
1− 2−n − 1|S|
≤ 1
1− 2|S|
(ii)
≤ 1
1− 4δ ≤ 1 + 16δ.
For the third inequality we used that |S| < 2n, which is implied by |S| ≤ 1δ from (ii) and using(
1
ε
)1/δ ≤ 2n/50.
Proof of completeness. Suppose the prover is honest. We prove completeness for the set M as
provided by Lemma 3.5. This lemma also gives that the protocol only outputs pairs of the form
(x,P(x)) where x ∈ M. Fix any x ∈ M and let p := P(x). Since the sets {Ms ∩M}s∈S form a
partition of M, we have that there is exactly one s∗ ∈ S such that x /∈Ms∗ . We find
PXP (x, p) =
∑
s∈S
PS(s)PXP |S=s(x, p) =
∑
s∈S\{s∗}
PS(s)PXP |S=s(x, p)
=
∑
s∈S\{s∗}
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
· PXP |S=s(x, p)
Lem. 3.5 (i)∈ (1± 132ε)
∑
s∈S\{s∗}
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
· P(x)
w(s)
= (1± 132ε)P(x) |S| − 1∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
.
Applying item (iii) of Claim 3.11 gives
(1− ε′)P(x) ≤ (1− 132ε)P(x) ≤ PXP (x, p) ≤ 1 + 132ε
1− 2−n P(x)
≤ (1 + 136ε)P(x) ≤ (1 + ε′)P(x),
where we used that ε ≥ 2−n, which follows from the assumption
(
1
ε
)1/δ ≤ 2n/50.
Proof of soundness. To prove soundness, we first define the event Bad. For s ∈ S let fs be the
function given by Lemma 3.6. The event Bad occurs if (S,X,P ) = (s, x, p) and p ≤ fs(x).
Proof of soundness (i). Part (i) of Lemma 3.6 states that Pr[Bad|S = s] ≤ 16εw(s) . Thus we find
Pr[Bad] =
∑
s∈S
PS(s) Pr[Bad|S = s] =
∑
s∈S
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
Pr[Bad|S = s]
≤
∑
s∈S
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
16ε
w(s)
=
16ε|S|∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
≤ 16ε(1 + 16δ) ≤ 300ε ≤ ε′.
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The second inequality holds by item (iv) of Claim 3.11, and the last inequality holds since δ ≤ 1.
Proof of soundness (ii). Fix any x ∈ {0, 1}n. We find∑
p
Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p) ∧ ¬Bad]
p
=
∑
p
∑
s∈S
PS(s) Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p) ∧ ¬Bad|S = s]
p
=
∑
s∈S
PS(s)
∑
p>fs(x)
PXP |S=s(x, p)
p
Lem. 3.6 (ii)
≤
∑
s∈S
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
(1 + 6ε)
w(s)
=
|S|(1 + 6ε)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
Claim 3.11 (iv)
≤ (1 + 16δ) (1 + 6ε) .
Thus, we conclude that∑
p
Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p)|¬Bad]
p
=
1
Pr[¬Bad]
∑
p
Pr[(X,P ) = (x, p) ∧ ¬Bad]
p
≤ 1
1− 300ε (1 + 16δ) (1 + 6ε) ≤ (1 + 600ε)(1 + 16δ)(1 + 6ε)
≤ 1 + 9000ε + 16δ ≤ 1 + ε′ + δ′.
3.5.4 The verifier’s running time
Proof of Lemma 3.4. It is sufficient to show that t and the number of elements in the sets Xi sent
by the prover are polynomial. Clearly t = poly(n/ε).
We now consider the sets Xi. Fix any k ∈ K and consider the corresponding value m. We first
consider the case where m = 0. By definition of m, this implies g ≥ log2
(∑
i∈Ik
2iεhi
)
. Thus we
find ∑
i∈I′
k
|Xi| ≤
∑
i∈I′
k
2(i+1)εhi ≤ 2ε
∑
i∈Ik
2iεhi ≤ 2ε2g ≤ 2 · 2g ≤ 4 · 2SamplingGap
= 4 · t · IntervalSize
′ · 22·IntervalSize′ε
ε4
=
8t log2
(
1
ε
) (
1
ε
)4/δ
δε5
= poly
(
n ·
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
.
In case m > 0 we find∑
i∈I′
k
|Xi| ≤
∑
i∈I′
k
2ε
2g2(i+1)εhi∑
j∈Ik
2jεhj
= 2ε2g2ε
∑
i∈I′
k
2iεhi∑
j∈Ik
2jεhj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ 4 · 2g
= poly
(
n ·
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
,
where the last equality follows as in the first case above.
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3.5.5 Bounding the probability of the event p ∈ Aj
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Fix s ∈ S. By definition of the protocol, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and j /∈⋃
ℓ∈K I ′ℓ(s), we have
∑
p∈Aj PXP |S=s(x, p) = 0 = rs(x, j), which implies the lemma. For any x ∈
{0, 1}n and j ∈ ⋃ℓ∈K I ′ℓ(s), we find the following.∑
p∈Aj
PXP |S=s(x, p) = Pr
X,P
[X = x ∧ P ∈ Aj|S = s] = Pr
X,J
[(X,J) = (x, j)|S = s] (8)
=
∑
k
Pr
F,J,X
[
(X,J) = (x, j)
∣∣∣(K,S) = (k, s)] · Pr
K
[K = k|S = s]
= Pr
F,J,X
[
(X,J) = (x, j)
∣∣∣(K,S) = (ks(j), s)] · Pr
K
[K = ks(j)|S = s]
=
wks(j)
w(s)
· Pr
F,J,X
[
F (x) = 0m
∣∣∣(K,S) = (ks(j), s)]
· Pr
F,J,X
[
(X,J) = (x, j)
∣∣∣(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]
=
wks(j)
2mw(s)
· Pr
F,J,X
[
(X,J) = (x, j)
∣∣∣(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]
=
wks(j)
2mw(s)
· Pr
J
[J = j|(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]
· Pr
F,X
[
X = x
∣∣∣(K,F (x), S, J) = (ks(j), 0m, s, j)]
=
wks(j)
2mw(s)
· Pr
J
[J = j|(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)] (9)
· Pr
X
[
X = x
∣∣∣(K,F (x), J, S) = (ks(j), 0m, j, s) ∧ (a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj] (10)
· Pr
F
[
(a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj
∣∣∣(K,F (x), J, S) = (ks(j), 0m, j, s)] (11)
The second inequality in (8) follows because P ∈ Aj if and only if J = j. The probability in (11)
equals rs(x, j) since the prover’s choice of the sets Xi is independent of J . The probability in (9)
equals
hj∑
i∈Iks(j)
hi
. The probability in (10) equals 1|Xj | , and to bound it we distinguish two cases:
If m = 0, condition (b) implies
1
2(j+1)εhj
≤ 1|Xj | ≤
1
2jεhj
,
and if m > 0, condition (b) implies
2−ε
∑
i∈Iks(j)
2iεhi
2g2(j+1)εhj
≤ 1|Xj| ≤ 2
ε
∑
i∈Iks(j)
2iεhi
2g2jεhj
.
Using the definition of m and wks(j), this gives the claim.
3.5.6 Proof of completeness: the details
Claim 3.12.
∑
i∈(t) hi ≥ 1− 2−n.
Proof. Note that the only elements not in
⋃
i∈(t) Bi are the elements B := {x : P(x) ≤ 2−(t+1)ε}.
By definition of t we have 2−(t+1)ε ≤ 2−⌈2n/ε⌉ε ≤ 2−2n. The claim follows by observing that∑
x∈B P(x) ≤ |{0, 1}n| · 2−2n = 2−n.
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Claim 3.13. We have
(i) P(M) ≥ 1− 2ε
(ii) The sets {Ms ∩M}s∈S form a partition of M.
Proof. To see (i), we note that P(M) ≥ ∑i∈(t) hi − t · ε2t ≥ 1 − 2−n − ε ≥ 1 − 2ε, where the first
inequality follows by definition of N , and the second inequality holds by Claim 3.12. Part (ii)
follows by definition.
Proof of Claim 3.8. Using the definition of m and hi ≥ ε2t , we find
|Bi|
2m
=
|Bi|2g∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
Claim 2.9≥ 2
g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
≥ 2
g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2max(Ik)εhℓ
≥ 2
g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2(i+IntervalSize)εhℓ
≥ 2
g2iεhi
2(i+IntervalSize)ε
=
2ghi
2IntervalSize·ε
≥ 2
SamplingGapε
2t2IntervalSize·ε
Claim 3.3 (iii)
≥ IntervalSize
4ε3
.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. By Claim 3.12, the verifier does not reject after receiving the prover’s first
message.
Fix s ∈ S. We first bound the probability that the verifier rejects because j /∈ I ′k given S = s.
First note that
Pr[J = j|S = s] = Pr[J = j ∧K = ks(j)|S = s]
= Pr[J = j|(S,K) = (s, ks(j))] · Pr[K = ks(j)|S = s]
≤ wks(j)
w(s)
· hj
wks(j)
=
hj
w(s)
,
where we write an inequality above because the verifier may reject in (a)-(c) before choosing j.
Thus, using the definition of N , we find
Pr[J /∈ N ] =
∑
j /∈N
Pr[J = j|S = s] ≤
∑
j /∈N
hj
w(s)
≤
∑
j /∈N
ε
2 · t · w(s)
≤ t · ε
2 · t · w(s) =
ε
2 · w(s) .
We bound the probability that the verifier rejects in (a)-(c) given S = s. Since the prover is
honest, (a) and (c) always hold. It remains to bound the probability that the verifier rejects in (b).
If m = 0, the verifier does not reject by Claim 2.9. So assume m > 0 and suppose K = k for some
k ∈ K. Then for any i ∈ I ′k we find
Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
2g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
, 2ε
2g2(i+1)εhi∑
ℓ∈Ik
2ℓεhℓ
]]
≤ Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
|Bi|
2m
, 2ε
|Bi|
2m
]]
≤ 2
m
(ε/2)2|Bi| ≤
16ε
IntervalSize
,
where the first inequality holds by definition of m and Claim 2.9, the second inequality is an
application of part (i) of the hash mixing lemma (Lemma 2.7) using (1± ε/2) ⊆ 2±ε, and the third
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inequality follows using Claim 3.8. Noting that |I ′k| ≤ IntervalSize and by the union bound, the
probability that there exists some i ∈ I ′k such that |Xi| is not in the desired interval is at most 16ε.
Thus, we conclude that the probability that the verifier rejects is bounded by
∑
s∈S
PS(s) ·
(
ε
2 · w(s) + 16ε
)
= 16ε +
∑
s∈S
w(s)∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
· ε
2 · w(s)
= 16ε+
ε
2
|S|∑
s′∈S w(s
′)
Claim 3.11 (iv)
≤ 16ε + ε
2
(1 + 16δ) ≤ 25ε.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. For a fixed k, let ms(k) be the value of m in the protocol given K = k and
S = s. By definition of the protocol, we have PXP |S=s(x, p) = 0 if p 6= P(x) or x /∈ M∩Ms. Fix
any s ∈ S and x ∈ M∩Ms. Then for some j we have x ∈ Bj , j ∈ I ′ks(j) and hj ≥ ε2t . Since the
prover is honest, we have rs(x, j) = PrF [(b)|(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]. In case ms(ks(j)) = 0
we find
rs(x, j) =
[
∀i ∈ I ′ks(j) : 2iεhi ≤ |Xi| ≤ 2(i+1)εhi
]
= 1,
since the event F (x) = 00 is always true, the honest prover defines Xi := Bi, and we used Claim 2.9.
We now consider the case ms(ks(j)) > 0. We find
rs(x, j) = Pr
F
[(b)|(K,F (x), S) = (ks(j), 0m, s)]
= Pr
F
[
∀i ∈ I ′ks(j) : 2−ε
2g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Iks(j)
2ℓεhℓ
≤ |Xi| ≤ 2ε 2
g2(i+1)εhi∑
ℓ∈Iks(j)
2ℓεhℓ∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)]
≥ 1−
∑
i∈I′
ks(j)
Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
2g2iεhi∑
ℓ∈Iks(j)
2ℓεhℓ
, 2ε
2g2(i+1)εhi∑
ℓ∈Iks(j)
2ℓεhℓ
]
∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)]
≥ 1−
∑
i∈I′
ks(j)
Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
|Bi|
2m
, 2ε
|Bi|
2m
]∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)] (12)
where the first inequality follows by the union bound, and the second inequality holds by definition
of m and Claim 2.9. To bound the probabilities in the sum in (12), we distinguish two cases. The
first case is i 6= j. By assumption we have x ∈ Bj and thus x /∈ Bi. We find
Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
|Bi|
2m
, 2ε
|Bi|
2m
]∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)]
≤ 2
m
(ε/2)2|Bi| ≤
16ε
IntervalSize
, (13)
where the first inequality is an application of part (ii) of the hash mixing lemma (Lemma 2.7) using
(1± ε/2) ∈ 2±ε, and the second inequality follows using Claim 3.8.
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The second case is i = j. Then by assumption we have x ∈ Bi. We find
Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
2−ε
|Bi|
2m
, 2ε
|Bi|
2m
]∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)]
≤ Pr
F
[
|Xi| /∈
[
1 +
(
1− ε
4
) |Bi| − 1
2m
, 1 +
(
1 +
ε
4
) |Bi| − 1
2m
]
∣∣∣(F (x), S) = (0m, s)]
≤ 2 · 2
m
(ε/4)2|Bi| ≤
27ε
IntervalSize
. (14)
The second inequality is an application of the hash mixing lemma (Lemma 2.7) part (iii) and using
that |Bi| ≥ 2 by Claim 3.8 combined with ε < 1/2, and the first inequality follows because on the
one hand, we have
1 +
(
1− ε
4
) |Bi| − 1
2m
≥
(
1− ε
4
)
(1 +
|Bi| − 1
2m
) =
(
1− ε
4
)
2m − 1 + |Bi|
2m
≥
(
1− ε
4
) |Bi|
2m
≥ (1− ε
2
)
|Bi|
2m
≥ 2−ε |Bi|
2m
,
where we used 2m ≥ 1, and on the other hand it holds that 1 + (1 + ε4) |Bi|−12m ≤ 2ε |Bi|2m . To see this,
we calculate
2ε
|Bi|
2m
−
(
1 +
(
1 +
ε
4
) |Bi| − 1
2m
)
≥ 2ε |Bi|
2m
−
(
1 +
ε
4
)(
1 +
|Bi| − 1
2m
)
≥ 2ε |Bi|
2m
−
(
1 +
ε
4
)(
1 +
|Bi|
2m
)
=
ε
4
( |Bi|
2m
− 1
)
− 1
Claim 3.8≥ ε
4
(IntervalSize
4ε3
− 1
)
− 1 ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows since ε < 1/10 and IntervalSize ≥ 1.
Finally, plugging (13) and (14) into (12), we find
rs(x, j) ≥ 1−
(
(IntervalSize − 1) 16ε
IntervalSize
+
27ε
IntervalSize
)
≥ 1− 27ε.
We showed that in both cases ms(ks(j)) = 0 and ms(ks(j)) > 0, we have 1− 27ε ≤ rs(x, j) ≤ 1.
Plugging this into Lemma 3.7 and since the honest prover always sends p = P(x), we find
q
(
x,P(x)
) ∈ [2−2ε(1− 27ε) 2−jε
w(s)
, 2ε
2−jε
w(s)
]
⊆
[
2−2ε(1− 27ε)P(x)
w(s)
, 2ε
2εP(x)
w(s)
]
⊆ (1± 132ε)P(x)
w(s)
,
where we used that x ∈ Bj implies 2−jε ∈ [P(x), 2εP(x)] for the first inclusion, and 2±2ε ⊆ (1± 4ε)
for the second inclusion.
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3.5.7 Proof of soundness: the details
Proof of Claim 3.10. Letting Ik := Ik(s) and I ′k := I ′k(s) we find∑
j∈Ik
rs(x, j) =
∑
j∈I′
k
rs(x, j)
=
∑
j∈I′
k
Pr
F
[
(a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj
∣∣∣(K,F (x), S) = (k, 0m, s)]
=
∑
j∈I′
k
∑
f :f(x)=0m
Pr
F
[F = h|(K,F (x), S) = (k, 0m, s)]
·
[
(a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj
∣∣∣(K,F (x), F, S) = (k, 0m, h, s)]
=
∑
f :f(x)=0m
Pr
F
[F = h|(K,F (x), S) = (k, 0m, s)]
·
∑
j∈I′
k
[
(a)− (c) ∧ x ∈ Xj
∣∣∣(K,F (x), F, S) = (k, 0m, h, s)]
≤
∑
f :f(x)=0m
Pr
F
[F = h|(K,F (x), S) = (k, 0m, s)] · 1 = 1,
where the last inequality holds since the prover either makes the verifier reject in (c), or sends sets
Xi that are pairwise disjoint.
4 Private Coins Versus Public Coins in Interactive Proofs
4.1 Theorem Statement and Discussion
An interactive proof has completeness c and soundness s if the verifier accepts with probability
at least c in case the prover’s claim is true, and at most s if the claim is false. Recall from
Definition 2.5 that IP denotes the set of languages that admit a k(n)-round private-coin interactive
proof (we write rounds = k(n)) with message length m(n) (msg size = m(n)), ℓ(n) many random
coins (coins = ℓ(n)), completeness c(n) (compl ≥ c(n)) and soundness s(n) (sound ≤ s(n)), where
the verifier runs in time t(n) (time = t(n)), where n denotes the input length. Also recall that for
the public-coin case, the set AM is defined analogously.
We state our theorem for the case where the public-coin verifier calls the private-coin verifier
exactly once. This highlights the overhead in the verifier’s running time, and allows to compare
our transformation to the one of [GS86] in a natural way. We remark that before applying the
transformation as given in the theorem, one can repeat the private-coin protocol in parallel to
amplify completeness and soundness. However, this requires that the original private-coin verifier
is called several times. Our main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 4.1. For any functions c, s, ε, δ : N → (0, 1), and k, t,m, ℓ : N→ N, if 1/ε, 1/δ, k, t,m, ℓ
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are time-constructible, then
IP

rounds = k
time = t
msg size = m
coins = ℓ
compl ≥ c
sound ≤ s

⊆ AM

rounds = 4k + 3
time = t+ k · poly
(
(m+ ℓ) ·
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
msg size = poly
(
(m+ ℓ) ·
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
coins = poly
(
(m+ ℓ) ·
(
1
ε
)1/δ)
compl ≥ c− 2(k + 1)ε
sound ≤ (1 + ε+ δ)k+1s+ (k + 1)ε

Moreover, in the protocol that achieves this transformation, the public-coin verifier calls the private-
coin verifier exactly once.
We state the following corollary that shows two interesting special cases for specific parameter
choices.
Corollary 4.2. The following inclusions hold:
(i) For any functions t,m, ℓ : N → N, polynomial k(n) and inverse polynomial γ(n) < 1/5, if
t,m, ℓ, k and 1/γ are time-constructible, we have
IP

rounds = k
time = t
msg size = m
coins = ℓ
compl ≥ 2/3 + γ
sound ≤ 2−(k+5)

⊆ AM

rounds = 4k + 3
time = t+ poly((m+ ℓ)kγ )
msg size = poly((m+ ℓ)kγ )
coins = poly((m+ ℓ)kγ )
compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

(ii) For any functions k, t,m, ℓ : N → N, and γ, ν : N → (0, 1), γ ≤ ν, if k, t,m, ℓ, 1/γ, 1/ν are
time-constructible, then
IP

rounds = k
time = t
msg size = m
coins = ℓ
compl ≥ 2/3 + γ
sound ≤ 1/3− ν

⊆ AM

rounds = 4k + 3
time = t+ poly
(
(m+ ℓ) · (kγ )k/ν
)
msg size = poly
(
(m+ ℓ) · (kγ )k/ν
)
coins = poly
(
(m+ ℓ) · (kγ )k/ν
)
compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

Moreover, in the protocols that achieve the transformations in (i) and (ii), the public-coin verifier
calls the private coin verifier exactly once.
The proof can be found in Section 4.5. Note that part (i) implies IP(rounds = k) ⊆ AM(rounds =
4k + 3) (where time = poly(n), compl ≥ 2/3, sound ≤ 1/3), as the error probabilities of the IP
protocol can be decreased by repeating it in parallel. As mentioned above, due to the repetition,
the private coin verifier needs to be called multiple times in the resulting protocol.
Next, we would like to compare our result to the [GS86] transformation. For this comparison, the
theorem below states what their transformation achieves after repeating the private-coin protocol
in parallel, i.e. we again consider the setting where the private-coin verifier is called exactly once
by the public-coin verifier.
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Theorem 4.3 ([GS86]). For any time-constructible polynomials k(n), t(n), m(n), and ℓ(n) we
have
IP

rounds = k
time = t
msg size = m
coins = ℓ
compl ≥ 1− ℓ−12k2
sound ≤ ℓ−12k2

⊆ AM

rounds = k + 2
time = t+ poly((m+ ℓ)k)
msg size = poly(m+ ℓ)
coins = poly(m+ ℓ)
compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

Moreover, in the protocol that achieves this transformation, the public-coin verifier calls the private
coin verifier exactly once.
By first repeating the IP protocol in parallel, this implies IP(rounds = k) ⊆ AM(rounds = k+2).
Comparing this theorem to our Corollary 4.2 (i), we see that our result only loses a polynomially
small fraction γ in completeness, and both losses in soundness and completeness are independent
of ℓ. If we apply Corollary 4.2 (ii) for constant k, polynomial t(n), any γ that is inverse polynomial
in n, and any constant ν > 0, we obtain a verifier that runs in polynomial time. This is stronger
than [GS86] in all parameters except the number of rounds.
If there exists a constant-round sampling protocol that achieves the guarantees of our theorem,
but the verifier runs in time poly( nεδ ), then we would get the transformation
IP

rounds = k
time = t
compl ≥ 2/3 + γ
sound ≤ 1/3− γ
 ⊆ AM

rounds = Θ(k)
time = poly(k·tγ )
compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

for any polynomially small γ and polynomial k (where the private-coin verifier is called exactly
once). It is an interesting open problem if this can be achieved.
4.2 The Protocol
Let (V, P ) be the IP (i.e. private-coin) protocol for some language L, as given in the theorem. We
assume that on input x, V chooses randomness r ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(|x|). For a fixed input x ∈ {0, 1}n we let
ℓ = ℓ(n), and M0, . . . ,Mk−1, and A0, . . . , Ak−1 be the random variables over the choice of r that
correspond to V ’s messages m0, . . . mk−1 and P ’s answers a0, . . . , ak−1 in the protocol execution
(V, P )(x). Furthermore, we let Γi := (M0, A0, . . . ,Mi, Ai) be the random variable over the entire
communication. We now describe the protocol (V ′, P ′) that achieves the transformation described
by Theorem 4.1. The protocol will use the sampling protocol of Theorem 3.2 several times, always
using parameters δ and ε. (V ′, P ′)(x) is defined as follows:
For i = 0, . . . , k − 1 do
Prover and Verifier: Use the sampling protocol to sample (mi, pi).
If the prover is honest, it honestly executes the sampling protocol for the distribution P
defined by
P(mi) := Pr
r
[Mi = mi|Γi−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mi−1, ai−1)].
Prover: Send ai to the verifier.
If the prover is honest, it sends ai := P (x, i,m0, . . . ,mi).
7
7Recall that P (x, i, m0, . . . , mi) is the prover’s answer in round i given input x and the previous verifier messages
mi.
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Prover and Verifier: Use the sampling protocol to sample (r∗, pk).
If the prover is honest, it honestly executes the sampling protocol for the distribution P
defined by
P(r∗) := Pr
r
[r∗ = r|Γk−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1)].
Verifier: Accept if and only if all of the following conditions hold:
(a) V (x, k, r∗,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept
(b)
∏k
i=0 pi =
1
2ℓ
4.3 Technical Overview
Theorem 4.1 follows by applying the completeness and soundness guarantees of the sampling proto-
col. Completeness is quite easy to see, since the completeness of the sampling protocol guarantees
that the correct probabilities are provided, and the distribution over the mi’s (or r’s in the last
round) is statistically close to the true distribution. In the following, we sketch the soundness proof.
To simplify the exposition we make two assumptions. The proof is not much harder when
these assumptions are omitted, and we refer to the full proof in Section 4.4 for details. First, we
assume that the event Bad never occurs (i.e. it has probability 0) in the sampling protocol. Second,
we only prove soundness for deterministic provers whose answers ai are fixed given the previous
(m0, p0, a0, . . . ,mi−1, pi−1, ai−1,mi, pi).
8
So suppose x /∈ L and let P ∗ be any prover that satisfies the above assumption. We denote the
randomness of V ′ by r′, letM ′i , P
′
i , A
′
i, R
∗ be the random variables over the choice of r′ corresponding
to mi, pi, ai, r
∗ in the protocol (V ′, P ∗)(x), and define Γ′i := (M
′
0, P
′
0, A
′
0, . . . ,M
′
i , P
′
i , A
′
i).
We first fix any γ′k−1 = (m0, p0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, pk−1, ak−1) that occurs with nonzero probability,
and let γk−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1). Now we bound the acceptance probability conditioned on
γ′k−1 as follows (we discuss the steps of this calculation below).
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1
]
=
∑
r∗∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept ∧R∗ = r∗|Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1
]
=
∑
r∗
Pr
r′
[
V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept ∧ Pk = 1
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0 pi
∧R∗ = r∗∣∣∣Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1]
=
∑
r∗
[V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept]
· Pr
r′
[
Pk =
1
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0 pi
∧R∗ = r∗
∣∣∣Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1
]
≤
∑
r∗
[V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept] · 1 + ε+ δ
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0 pi
=
1 + ε+ δ∏k−1
i=0 pi
· Pr
r∈{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γk−1) = accept] (15)
8 We cannot assume this in general, as the prover may for example choose ai depending on a hash function that
was chosen in some earlier execution of the sampling protocol.
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We used the notation [·] for a Boolean expression, which is defined to be 1 iff the expression is true.
Furthermore, we applied the soundness guarantee of the sampling protocol to obtain the above
inequality.
Using this, we can proceed to bound the acceptance probability conditioned on any fixed γ′k−2 =
(m0, p0, a0, . . . ,mk−2, pk−2, ak−2) as follows (we again discuss the steps of this calculation below).
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Γ′k−2 = γ′k−2
]
=
∑
mk−1,pk−1
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept
∣∣(Γ′k−2,M ′k−1, P ′k−1) = (γ′k−2,mk−1, pk−1)]
· Pr
r′
[
(M ′k−1, P
′
k−1) = (mk−1, pk−1)|Γ′k−2 = γ′k−2
]
=
∑
mk−1,pk−1
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept
∣∣(Γ′k−1) = (γ′k−2,mk−1, pk−1, a∗k−1)]
· Pr
r′
[
(M ′k−1, P
′
k−1) = (mk−1, pk−1)|Γ′k−2 = γ′k−2
]
≤
∑
mk−1,pk−1
1 + ε+ δ∏k−1
i=0 pi
· Pr
r
[
V (x, k, r, γk−2,mk−1, a
∗
k−1) = accept
]
· Pr
r′
[
(M ′k−1, P
′
k−1) = (mk−1, pk−1)|Γ′k−2 = γ′k−2
]
=
1 + ε+ δ∏k−2
i=0 pi
∑
mk−1
Pr
r
[
V (x, k, r, γk−2,mk−1, a
∗
k−1) = accept
]
·
∑
pk−1
Prr′
[
(M ′k−1, P
′
k−1) = (mk−1, pk−1)|Γ′k−2 = γ′k−2
]
pk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤(1+ε+δ)
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)
2∏k−2
i=0 pi
∑
mk−1
Pr
r
[
V (x, k, r, γk−2,mk−1, a
∗
k−1) = accept
]
The second inequality above follows by our assumption that for fixed values γ′k−2,mk−1, pk−1, the
prover’s answer Ak−1 is also fixed. We denote this value by a
∗
k−1 and stress that formally this is
a function of (γ′k−2,mk−1, pk−1). We proceed to use this notation below, and in the given context
the values a∗i must always be interpreted as a function of (γ
′
i−1,mi, pi). This notation is somewhat
sloppy, but we use it here to simplify the exposition, and treat the issue more formally in the full
soundness analysis of Section 4.4.2.
The first inequality above follows from Eqn. 15, and the underbraced term is bounded using
the soundness guarantee of the sampling protocol (noting that in each execution of the sampling
protocol, the verifier uses independent random coins).
Finally, repeating the above calculation conditioning on γ′k−3, γ
′
k−4 and so on yields that
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept
] ≤ (1 + ε+ δ)k+1
·
∑
m0
∑
m1
. . .
∑
mk−1
Pr
r
[
V (x, k, r,m0, a
∗
0, . . . ,mk−1, a
∗
k−1) = accept
]
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)k+1s,
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where for the second inequality we used that V only accepts if the transcript is consistent, and
applied the soundness guarantee of the protocol (V, P ).
Removing the simplifying assumptions. We briefly sketch how the two simplifying assump-
tions in the proof sketch can be waived.
First, as the event Bad occurs with probability at most ε for each sampling protocol invocation,
one simply conditions the analysis on no bad event occurring. This induces the additional error
term of (k + 1)ε.
Second, we show below that the proof above can be modified to deal with general provers who
may send arbitrary answers ai. This is quite intuitive, and our analysis shows that the best strategy
for the prover is to send the ai that maximize the acceptance probability of the verifier V .
4.4 Analysis of the Protocol
4.4.1 Proof of completeness
Suppose x ∈ L and fix the honest prover P ′. For any i ∈ (k − 1) the following holds. For any
γi = (m0, a0, . . . mi, ai), where ai = P (x, i,m0, . . . ,mi), letting γi−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mi−1, ai−1), we
have
Pr
r
[Γi = γi] = Pr
r
[(Mi, Ai) = (mi, ai)|Γi−1 = γi−1] · Pr
r
[Γi−1 = γi−1]
= Pr
r
[Mi = mi|Γi−1 = γi−1] · Pr
r
[Γi−1 = γi−1] , (16)
where the first equality holds by the definition of conditional probabilities, and the second inequality
holds because the prover is deterministic and ai = P (x, i,m0, . . . ,mi).
Furthermore, since any fixed r uniquely determines Γk−1, we find that for any r
∗ and any
γk−1 = (m0, a0, . . .mk−1, ak−1) where (x, r
∗, γk−1) is consistent for V we have
Pr
r
[r∗ = r|Γk−1 = γk−1] · Pr
r
[Γk−1 = γk−1] = Pr
r
[r∗ = r] =
1
2ℓ
. (17)
The completeness of the sampling protocol implies that if some output m is generated, then it is
generated along with P(m). Together with (16) and (17), this implies that in case the verifier does
not reject in the sampling protocols, (b) holds.
The next claim states that the output distribution given by the sampling protocol (when inter-
acting with the honest prover for some distribution P) is close to the distribution P.
Claim 4.4. Fix a distribution P over {0, 1}n, and δ, ε ∈ (0, 1). Let P′ be the following distribution
over {0, 1}n ∪ {⊥}: Run the sampling protocol of Theorem 3.2 for P with parameters δ, ε and the
honest prover. If the verifier rejects, return ⊥. Otherwise, let (x, p) be the verifier’s output and
return x. Then the statistical distance between P and P′ is at most 2ε.
Proof. Let M be the set given by the completeness guarantee of the sampling protocol. By com-
pleteness, for any x ∈ M we have P′(x) ∈ (1 ± ε)P(x). Furthermore, we have P(M) ≤ ε. This
implies the claim.
Thus, by coupling, we may assume that in each invocation of the sampling protocol, the bitstring
is sampled according to the distribution P, and this fails with probability at most 2ε. Thus, with
probability 1 − (k + 1)2ε we simulate an execution of the protocol (V, P ), which accepts with
probability at least c.
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4.4.2 Proof of soundness: overview
Suppose x /∈ L and let P ∗ be any deterministic prover.9 We denote the randomness of V ′ by r′. For
i ∈ (k) let Badi be the event that occurs if in the i’th execution of the sampling protocol the event
Bad as described in Theorem 3.2 occurs. Furthermore, let Bad′ = Bad0 ∨ . . . ∨ Badk. As V ′ uses
independent random coins for each execution of the sampling protocol, and by Theorem 3.2 each
event Badi occurs with probability at most ε, we find that Prr′ [(V
′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept] equals
Pr
r′
[(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|¬Bad′] Pr
r′
[¬Bad′]
+ Pr
r′
[(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Bad′] Pr
r′
[Bad′]
≤Pr
r′
[(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|¬Bad′] + Pr
r′
[Bad′]
≤Pr
r′
[(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|¬Bad′] + (k + 1)ε.
We proceed to bound the acceptance probability conditioned on ¬Bad′. Let M ′i , P ′i , A′i, R∗ be
the random variables over the choice of r′ corresponding to mi, pi, ai, r
∗ in the protocol (V ′, P ∗)(x),
and additionally define Γ′i := (M
′
0, P
′
0, A
′
0, . . . ,M
′
i , P
′
i , A
′
i).
Claim 4.5. Fix any γ′k−1 = (m0, p0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, pk−1, ak−1) that satisfies Prr′
[
Γ′k−1 = γ
′
k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
>
0, and let γk−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1). Then we have
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
(18)
≤ 1 + ε+ δ∏k−1
i=0 pi
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γk−1) = accept] .
As the proof is not difficult, we only give a proof sketch. The formal proof can be found in
Section 4.4.3.
Proof (Sketch). By definition of the protocol, the verifier V ′ accepts if and only if V (x, k,R∗, γk−1) =
accept and Pk =
1
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0
pi
. The soundness condition (ii) of the sampling protocol guarantees that
for any r∗ the probability of R∗ = r∗ ∧ Pk = 1
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0
pi
(under the given conditions) is bounded by
1+ε+δ
2ℓ
∏k−1
i=0
pi
. As V chooses r uniformly in {0, 1}ℓ, this gives the claim.
Claim 4.6. Fix any i ∈ (k) and γ′i−1 = (m0, p0, a0, . . . ,mi−1, pi−1, ai−1) with Prr′ [Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧
¬Bad′] > 0, and let γi−1 = (m0, a0, . . . ,mi−1, ai−1). Then we have
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)
k−i+1∏i−1
j=0 pj
∑
mi
max
ai
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}m
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
))
.
In the proof we only omit one step, which can be found in Section 4.4.3, Claim 4.7.
9 By a standard argument, we may assume that the prover is deterministic: for any probabilistic prover, we
consider the deterministic prover that maximizes the verifier’s acceptance probability.
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Proof. The proof is by induction for decreasing i. The base case for i = k is given by Claim 4.5.
For the induction step, we assume the claim holds for i+ 1, and our goal is to prove it for i.
We note that Prr′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
equals∑
pi,mi
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i ) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi) ∧ ¬Bad′
]
(19)
· Pr
r′
[
(M ′i , P
′
i ) = (mi, pi)|Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
.
Now the probability in (19) can be bounded using the induction hypothesis. (We do this formally
in Claim 4.7.) This gives that the above sum equals
∑
pi,mi
(1 + ε+ δ)k−i∏i
j=0 pj
max
ai
(∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
)))
· Pr
r′
[
(M ′i , P
′
i ) = (mi, pi)|Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
=
(1 + ε+ δ)k−i∏i−1
j=0 pj
∑
mi
max
ai
(∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
)))
∑
pi
Prr′
[
(M ′i , P
′
i ) = (mi, pi)|Γ′i−1 = γ′i−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
pi
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)
k−i+1∏i−1
j=0 pj
∑
mi
max
ai
(∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
)))
,
where the inequality follows from the soundness condition (ii) of the sampling protocol (Theo-
rem 3.2).
Finally, applying Claim 4.6 for i = 0 gives that
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|¬Bad′] ≤ (1 + ε+ δ)k+1 ∑
m0
max
a0
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
))
.
This finishes the proof, since the soundness of the protocol (V, P ) implies that∑
m0
max
a0
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r,m0, a0, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
))
is at most s. This inequality holds because according to Definition 2.4, the verifier always rejects
in case the protocol transcript is not consistent.
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4.4.3 Proof of soundness: the details
Proof of Claim 4.5. The probability in (18) equals∑
r∗∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept ∧R∗ = r∗|Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′
]
=
∑
r∗
Pr
r′
[
V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept ∧ Pk = 1
2ℓ ·∏k−1i=0 pi ∧R∗ = r∗∣∣∣Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′]
=
∑
r∗
Pr
r′
[
Pk =
1
2ℓ ·∏k−1i=0 pi ∧R∗ = r∗
∣∣∣Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′]
· Pr
r′
[
V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept∣∣∣Γ′k−1 = γ′k−1 ∧ ¬Bad′ ∧ Pk = 1
2ℓ ·∏k−1i=0 pi ∧R∗ = r∗
]
≤ 1 + ε+ δ
2ℓ ·∏k−1i=0 pi
∑
r∗
[V (x, k, r∗, γk−1) = accept]
=
1 + ε+ δ∏k−1
i=0 pi
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γk−1) = accept] ,
where the inequality is implied by the soundness condition (ii) of the sampling protocol (Theo-
rem 3.2).
Claim 4.7. Assuming Claim 4.6 holds for i+ 1, we have for any (pi,mi) that
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i ) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi) ∧ ¬Bad′
]
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)
k−i∏i
j=0 pj
max
ai
(∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
)))
.
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Proof. We find
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept|(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i ) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi) ∧ ¬Bad′
]
=
∑
ai
Pr
r′
[
(V ′(r′), P ∗)(x) = accept∣∣(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i , A′i) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi, ai) ∧ ¬Bad′]
· Pr
r′
[
A′i = ai|(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i ) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi) ∧ ¬Bad′
]
≤
∑
ai
(1 + ε+ δ)k−i∏i
j=0 pj
∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
))
· Pr
r′
[
A′i = ai|(Γ′i−1,M ′i , P ′i ) = (γ′i−1,mi, pi) ∧ ¬Bad′
]
≤ (1 + ε+ δ)
k−i∏i
j=0 pj
max
ai
(∑
mi+1
max
ai+1
(
. . .
∑
mk−1
max
ak−1
(
Pr
r←{0,1}ℓ
[V (x, k, r, γi−1,mi, ai, . . . ,mk−1, ak−1) = accept]
)))
,
where the first inequality follows from the assumption in the claim.
4.5 Our Transformation for Specific Parameter Choices
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Part (i) follows if we set ε := γ2(k+1) , and δ := 1/2.
We proceed to prove (ii). First, Theorem 4.1 gives for any δ and ε ≤ δ that
IP

rounds = k
time = t
msg size = m
coins = ℓ
compl ≥ 2/3 + 2(k + 1)ε
sound ≤ 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)2−4δ(k+1)

⊆ AM

rounds = 4k + 3
time = t+ k · poly((m+ ℓ)(1/ε)1/δ)
msg size = poly((m+ ℓ)(1/ε)1/δ)
coins = poly((m+ ℓ)(1/ε)1/δ)
compl ≥ 2/3
sound ≤ 1/3

. (20)
To see this, we apply the theorem for c := 2/3+2(k+1)ε and s := 1/3(1− 3(k+1)ε)2−4δ(k+1) and
note that since (1 + 2δ) ≤ 24δ we have
s = 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)2−4δ(k+1) ≤ 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)
(1 + 2δ)k+1
≤ 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)
(1 + ε+ δ)k+1
.
Now given ν and γ, we set δ := ν4(k+1) , and ε :=
γ
4(k+1) . Since γ ≤ ν, we have ε ≤ δ and we can
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apply (20). We find
1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)2−4δ(k+1) = 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)2−ν
≥ 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε)(1 − 2ν) ≥ 1/3(1 − 3(k + 1)ε− 2ν)
= 1/3− (k + 1)ε− 2ν/3 ≥ 1/3 − ν,
where we used ε ≤ δ for the last inequality. Furthermore, we have 2/3 + 2(k + 1)ε = 2/3 + γ/2 ≤
2/3 + γ. These two inequalities imply the claim.
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